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Abstract
I present an overlapping generations model, with formal education as the engine of growth,
close to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). Contrary to Glomm and Ravikumar, I show that
public schooling, when compared to a private system, may stimulate economic growth.
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1 Introduction
The question addressed in this paper is whether public schooling is growth enhancing
or growth inhibiting when compared to a private system. In my model the engine of
growth is formal schooling. It is known from the literature, see Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) and Zhang (1996) as the leading references  also see Bräuninger and Vidal
(2000), that one of the e¤ects of the public system is the reduction in inequality.
This happens because all agents face the same quality of education, while in a private
system richer families have better schooling. So, on distributional grounds, there is a
consensus that a public system is superior to a private system, at least if one considers
equality as a goal.
A more intriguing result is that they conclude that a public education system
reduces economic growth. Even when in the presence of homogenous agents this
result is true due to a negative scal externality. According to Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), students study more in a private system and hence accumulate more human
capital. This happens because agents include the money they invest on the education
of their children in their utility function. This e¤ect is internalized only in a private
system.
In this paper, I argue that if altruistic behavior of the parents is not allowed,
the results are reversed, with public schooling becoming growth enhancing relative to
private schooling.
2 The Model
I consider a basic Overlapping Generations (OG) model in which agents maximize
utility over a life time of two periods. Each generation consists of a continuum of
agents. In each period we have a generation of old agents and a generation of newborn
agents.
Contrary to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Zhang (1996), I consider the
young generation to be responsible for nancing their education. I do not introduce
gifts in the utility function of the parents. Hence, the decision is fully internal. Young
agents have access to international capital markets and can use their human capital
as a collateral to nance their education spending.
To simplify, I assume, as in Galor and Zeira (1993), a small open economy with
perfect access to the international capital markets. Agents can borrow at an exoge-
nous interest rate r. I assume r = 0. We can interpret this assumption as capturing
the student loans at subsidized interest rates, common in some countries (although
assuming r > 0 does not change the results).
I assume that agents only consume in their second period of life. The utility
function of the agents born in period t is given by:
u (ct;t; ct;t+1) = ct;t+1 (1)
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In the rst period of their lives, agents have to decide whether to go to the
university or not and how much money and time they spend on education. The
human capital of an agent born in t depends on these choices and also on the human
capital of the parent and on the average human capital of the old agents in the
economy:
ht = t (et)
 (Ht 1)
 (ht 1)
 ; 0 < ; ; ;  < 1 and  +  +  = 1 (2)
where ht 1 is the human capital of the young agents parent, Ht 1 is the average
human capital at time t of the generation born in t  1, et  0 is the money invested
in education and t 2 [0; 1] is the time spent in School. One can interpret the inuence
of et and Ht 1 as measuring the quality of the school.
In a private system, if an agent wants to study she chooses et. In a public system,
the agent pays nothing when studying, and the total spending on education in each
period is nanced by taxes raised on all agents (young and old) working in the next
period. The money spent per student in education, and hence the necessary tax rate
to support that expenditure, is decided by majority voting.
We can interpret this model as one in which basic education, say at a high school
level, is guaranteed (for example, through compulsory schooling), but above that it
is a private decision.
On the production side, I assume a linear technology (production of each worker
is equal to her human capital), and hence wages coincide with the human capital.
To capture the heterogeneity of the agents, I assume that old agents in the same
generation are di¤erentiated by their stock of human capital according to some dis-
tribution function Gt.
I assume no xed costs in education and I am considering education to be a pure
rival good. Relaxing these assumptions would make the case for public education
stronger.
2.1 Equilibrium in the private system
The agents optimization problem is to choose t; et; ct;t+1 to maximize
u (ct;t; ct;t+1) = ct;t+1
subject to
ct;t+1 = t (et)
 (Ht 1)
 (ht 1)
 + (1  t) t (et) (Ht 1) (ht 1)   ett
The rst term is the value of the human capital of the agent at time t + 1, the
second term is the value of the human capital, times the time spent working in period
t, so it represents the wages earned in the rst period. The last term is the money
the agent borrowed to nance her education. For a strictly positive level of et, the
optimal time spent on studying is given by:
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t = 1  e
1 
t
2Ht 1h

t 1
(3)
For et = 0 the agent is indi¤erent between any choice of t: I assume that in case
of indi¤erence the agent choose t = 1  e
1 
t
2Ht h

t
.
With this information we can nd the optimal level of et:
et =

2
2  
 1
1 
H

1 
t 1 h

1 
t 1 (4)
Plugging this result in equation 3:
t = 2
1  
2  
So the human capital of this individual is:
ht =
2  2
2  

2
2  
 
1 
H

1 
t 1 h

1 
t 1 (5)
2.2 Equilibrium in the public system
Under the public education regime there is a voting process to decide, by majority
rule, how much is spent on education, and, simultaneously, the tax rate necessary to
support that expenditure.
I solve the individuals optimization problem in two steps. First, I take, as given,
the tax rate  t+1 (I assume a steady state tax rate,  t+1 =  t = ) and the education
expenses et and determine the optimal time of schooling:
max
t
ct;t+1
subject to
ct;t+1 = t (et)
 (Ht 1)
 (ht 1)
 (1  ) + (1  t) t (et) (Ht 1) (ht 1) (1  )
Solving we get t = 1. The optimal tax rate, from this agents perspective, can
be determined by solving the problem:
max
ct;t+1;et; t+1
ct;t+1
subject to
ct;t+1 = t (et)
 (Ht 1)
 (ht 1)
 (1  )
et = 
R
(et)
 (Ht 1)
 (ht 1)
 dGt 1
where the second restriction is just a balanced government budget restriction, which
can be solved with respect to  :
 =
(et)
1 
(Ht 1)
 R (ht 1) dGt 1
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Given this result, the optimal et is:
et =

 (Ht 1)

Z
(ht 1)
 dGt 1
 1
1 
(6)
which implies:
 =  (7)
The preferred tax rate and the education expenditure are independent of the
human capital of the agents parent, and hence we have unanimous voting among the
young. The old at time t will be indi¤erent about the taxes at t+ 1, and hence they
will not veto this tax rate. In a steady state equilibrium, the tax rate is  and the
education expenditure is given by 6.
The law of motion of the individuals human capital is:
ht = 

1  (Ht 1)

1  (ht 1)

Z
(ht 1)
 dGt 1
 
1 
(8)
3 Comparisons between the two systems
3.1 Homogeneous agents
Consider the case of homogeneous agents. This hypothesis helps us to understand
the growth implications of each of the systems by abstracting from inequality issues.
The distribution function Gt 1 is degenerate and Et (ht 1)
 = (ht 1)
. Using 8
we have the law of motion for human capital under the public system:
hpublict = 

1  (Ht 1)

1 

hpublict 1
 
1 
For the private system we have:
hprivatet =
2  2
2  

2
2  
 
1 
H

1 
t 1
 
hprivatet 1
 
1 
Proposition 1 if hpublic0 = h
private
0 and  < 0:615 then for t  1 we always have
hpublict > h
private
t
Proof. To prove this result I only need to show that


1  > 2 2
2 
 
2
2 
 
1 
, 0 <  < 0:615018
The last step was solved numerically using Maple V.
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This is the key result of the paper. Contrary to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)
and Zhang (1996), the public school system may be growth enhancing relatively to a
purely private system. To know which of the systems is actually better for growth, one
has to estimate the elasticity of private income with respect to education spending.
It is unlikely that the elasticity is larger than 60%, so, for the rest of the paper, I
assume that 0 <  < 0:615018:
3.2 Heterogeneous agents
As in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Zhang (1996), I assume that Gt is lognormal
with parameters (t; 
2
t ). The evolution of these parameters can be calculated using
the human capital motion equations and the properties of the lognormal distribution.
For the public schooling, using 8:
ht = 

1  (Ht 1)

1  (ht 1)
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With private schooling, using 5:
t = ln
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Proposition 2 Consider two economies, with the same education system and the
same average human capital in period t. In period t+ 1 the economy with the lowest
variance will have a higher average human capital.
Proof. See proposition 6 of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
Proposition 3 Consider two identical economies with di¤erent education regimes at
time t. If income inequality is not too large then the economy with public schooling
will have a higher average human capital at period t+ 1.
Proof. Let ut and 2t characterize the economy with public schooling, and u
0
t and 
02
t
characterize the economy with private schooling. Given our assumptions (t; 
2
t ) =
(0t; 
02
t ) :
Ht+1 = exp

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+
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So Ht+1 > H 0t+1 i¤
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
2 2
2 
 
2
2 
 
1 

+ 
2
(1 )2
2t
2
Given our assumption that 0 <  < 0:615018 we have 
1  ln > ln

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 
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
and hence, if 2t is not too large, we will have Ht+1 > H
0
t+1:
We are left, again, with an empirical question. What is the meaning of saying that
2t is not too large? Consider for example:  =
1
3
and  = 1
3
. In this case the theorem
holds if t < 3:1675: Taking the United States as a benchmark, and assuming that
the income distribution follows a log normal distribution, then, table 3 of Gottschalk
and Smeeding (1997) imply a value of  around 0:6:
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I challenged the conclusion of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Zhang
(1996) that public education hinders economic growth when compared to a private
education system. The conclusion of Zhang (1996) that public education may be
growth enhancing only if income inequality is very big was also contested. The key
to revert their results was to fully internalize the investment decisions in education.
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